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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Different jurisdictions across the world adopt different 
models of national arbitration laws. These laws provide the 
external parameters within which any arbitration taking place 
in that country must fall.1 There are peculiarities in these laws, 
whether it is in England,2 Germany,3 the United States4 or 
other jurisdictions that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law,5 for instance.  
                                                 
 
 
1 “External parameters” refers to the fact that the Rules chosen by parties 
will primarily guide their proceedings. The domestic arbitration law 
comes into play in these three situations: (1) to provide guidance where 
parties have not agreed; (2) to supplement the Rules where the chosen 
Rules do not provide for certain issues in the process; and (3) it applies 
regardless of parties’ agreement where the provision is of a mandatory 
character. 
2 Arbitration Act 1996, 2 (Eng.). 
3 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 1025-1066 
(1998); see generally THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW - LEX FACIT ARBITRUM, 2 
ARB. INT'L 241, 244 (1986). [hereinafter UNCITRAL]. (The German 
Arbitration Act of 1998 is substantially based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law). 
4 United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 
(2018).   
5 UNCITRAL, supra note 3. (As the name suggests, this is a model law 
prepared and adopted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) with the hope that states will 
incorporate or adopt its provisions into their domestic arbitration regime. 
The current version was adopted in 2006. Presently, 78 states have 
adopted this law in some form as their domestic arbitration law) See Status: 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
Amendments_as_Adopted_in_2006,_UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985
Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (UNCITRAL is 
also simply referred to as “the Model Law”). 
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Unlike many other countries that are major venues for 
international arbitration, the United States has not enacted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.6 In the U.S., the 92-year-old Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides the legislative framework 
for arbitration.7 In general, the FAA, like the Model Law, 
provides certain similar features and bases for international 
arbitration. For instance, the FAA supports the principles of 
party autonomy and limited local curial involvement in the 
arbitration.8 Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are to be 
enforced in accordance with their terms, and arbitral awards 
are shielded from judicial review on the merits.9  
Nonetheless, the FAA and the Model Law differ in 
several ways, most notably with respect to: (1) the basis for 
setting aside an award; (2) the power to modify or correct an 
award; (3) the procedure for appointment of arbitrators; and, 
most importantly, (4) the arbitral tribunal’s power to rule on 
its own jurisdiction,10 which is the focus of this paper. Of 
course, a well-drafted arbitration agreement that incorporates 
recognized arbitration rules will render academic most, if not 
all, of these differences, as the parties’ agreement will 
generally trump or supplement the default provisions of the 
FAA and the Model Law. 
The differences between the FAA and Model Law may 
be significant in situations where the parties’ agreement fails 
to address some of these issues. In BG Group PLC v. Republic 
                                                 
 
 
6 Dana H. Freyer, The United States Federal Arbitration Act and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law: How and Why are They Different?, IPBA JOURNAL 





412 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
of Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
arbitral jurisdiction.11 Notably, the BG Group arbitration was 
an investment arbitration decided outside the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
framework.12 Because it was a non-ICSID investment 
arbitration, the parties chose Washington, D.C., as the 
juridical seat for the proceedings, which meant that the FAA 
applied automatically as the lex arbitri. Consequently, certain 
features of the FAA (or lack thereof) kicked in, particularly 
with respect to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine 
its own jurisdiction, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz.13 The 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle is treated much differently in 
the U.S. under the FAA than in most other jurisdictions that 
                                                 
 
 
11 BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1204 (2014) (“[W]ho—
court or arbitrator—bears primary responsibility for interpreting and 
applying the local litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?”). 
12 In most cases, investor-state arbitrations are conducted under the 
auspices of the ICSID. However, there is a certain category commonly 
referred to as “non-ICSID investment arbitration.” These kinds of 
investment arbitrations, as the name implies, are conducted outside 
ICSID. Parties choose a juridical seat for the proceedings, thereby 
subjecting the proceedings to the national law of the state.  
13 See BG Group PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204-05. (This paper utilizes the German 
term “Kompetenz-Kompetenz”, meaning “jurisdiction concerning 
jurisdiction,” largely for historical purposes, as the doctrine originated in 
the German courts); See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 n.44 (2012); see 
also Shirin Philipp, Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v. 
Kaplan in Light of European Reform Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 119, 134-38 (1996). (The doctrine refers to the ability of arbitrators to 
rule on their own jurisdiction over a party or dispute); See Dominique T. 
Hascher, Injunctions in Favor of and Against Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 189, 191 (2010) (The French term “compétence-compétence” denotes 
the same principle). 
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have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. This difference is 
responsible for the fact that in BG Group, the issue of 
jurisdiction was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. 
The foregoing therefore raises the following questions: would 
this dispute have been resolved much quicker than the eleven 
years it took, if it were decided under the Model Law? Are 
states better off leaving their investment disputes to be 
decided under the ICSID framework? Would Kompetenz-
Kompetenz in the U.S. be clearer, and therefore more efficient, 
if there were an express textual basis under the FAA?    
In this paper, I will focus not so much on the substance 
of the decision in BG Group; rather, I will utilize the BG Group 
decision as a platform to discuss the differences in the 
treatment of Kompetenz-Kompetenz under the U.S. system, the 
FAA, and the UNCITRAL regime. The FAA does not 
expressly provide for Kompetenz-Kompetenz—this principle 
derives from U.S. jurisprudence. In Part II, I will reexamine 
the jurisprudence that American courts have developed to 
address the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This will 
necessarily involve exploring the principle of arbitrability as 
a mechanism utilized by U.S. courts to determine arbitral 
jurisdiction. Part III discusses Kompetenz-Kompetenz under the 
UNCITRAL regime, highlighting the clear textual foundation 
it provides for Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Part III also looks at the 
limitations on the exercise of this authority. Part IV provides 
a brief comparative analysis from different jurisdictions to 
showcase how courts have applied this principle in other 
parts of the world. Part V shows how this principle was 
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in BG Group. I conclude 
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II. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
 
After “The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as 
generally understood, recognizes the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction.14 The breadth of 
this formulation has unfortunately generated much 
misunderstanding.”15 The FAA, unlike most other arbitration 
statutes, does not expressly provide, in clear language, for this 
authority. Section 3 of the FAA refers to motions to stay court 
proceedings where issues before the court are subject to 
arbitration. This section “is notorious among world 
arbitration statutes for its failure to incorporate the 
[K]ompetenz-[K]ompetenz doctrine.”16 It reads:  
 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of 
the courts of the United States upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in 
writing for such arbitration, the court in which 
such suit is pending upon being satisfied that the 
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is 
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, 
shall on application of one of the parties stay the 
trial of the action until such arbitration has been 
had in accordance with the terms of the 
                                                 
 
 
14 Bermann, supra note 13, at 13-14. 
15 Id. at 14. 
16 Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach 
to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 355 (1997) (quoting Thomas 
E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice 
Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 17 (1995)).  
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agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such 
arbitration.17 
 
In addition to staying the proceedings, section 4 
provides for authority of the court to compel arbitration. It 
reads in part: 
 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, 
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under 
a written agreement for arbitration may petition 
[the court] . . . for an order directing that such 
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for 
in such agreement.18 
 
These provisions of the FAA come closest to textually 
addressing the threshold issue of arbitral jurisdiction. As is 
hopefully evident from these provisions, they empower the 
court only to decide such threshold issues.19 On the FAA 
provisions’ face, however, they appear to exclude arbitral 
authority to make such a decision.20 This position was 
subsequently espoused in case law.21 
In giving effect to the FAA, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals gradually adopted a “federal policy that, when 
construing arbitration agreements, every doubt is to be 
                                                 
 
 
17 United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018) (emphasis 
added).  
18 Id. § 4.  
19 Wyss, supra note 16, at 356. 
20 See Adriana Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77, 79 (2002). 
21 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
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resolved in favor of arbitration.”22 Indeed, so widespread was 
the adoption of this “policy” that by 1981 the Seventh Circuit 
felt comfortable declaring it “axiomatic.”23 On the basis of this 
lower court consensus, the Supreme Court itself ruled in 1983 
that, “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration[.]”24 
B. FIRST OPTIONS: REVERSE PRESUMPTION AND JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM? 
The “presumption of arbitrability” seemed to suggest 
that the arbitration panel, rather than the court, would be 
empowered to determine the arbitrability of disputes unless 
the parties expressly agreed that arbitrability would be 
decided by a court. After all, if “doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues” were to be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, then any doubt regarding who was to decide 
arbitrability should likewise be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, at least absent a clear agreement to the contrary.25 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this 
conclusion in 1995. The Court utilized the opportunity in First 
                                                 
 
 
22 Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
23 Id. 
24 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983). 
25 Deciding Who Decides Questions of Arbitrability: A Survey of American Law 
and a Comparative Perspective, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAWYERS, 
https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/news-events/article-
november-2015-deciding-who-decides-questions-of-arbitrability-a-
survey-of-american-law-and-a-comparative-perspective/ (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2018).  
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Options to define the bounds of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in 
American jurisprudence.26 In its opinion, the Court took a 
contractual view of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, in the sense that its 
existence is solely based on a “‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’” 
agreement of the parties, which could be determined from the 
language of the agreement.27 Thus, under this “clear and 
unmistakable” standard, American courts begin their 
jurisdictional analysis with the presumption that tribunals do 
not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz to determine jurisdiction.28 
This implies that in order to overcome this presumption, a 
party must show that it agreed to submit the “arbitrability 
question” to arbitral determination.29 In dictum in First 
Options, the Supreme Court “supplied a verbal hook” on 
which the analysis of Kompetenz-Kompetenz “has been hung.” 
Subsequent cases, including BG Group, invariably “cite First 
Options for the dual proposition that (i) contracting parties 
may agree to arbitrate jurisdictional matters (questions about 
                                                 
 
 
26 Ashley Cook, Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Varying Approaches and a Proposal for 
a Limited Form of Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 17, 24 
(2014). 
27 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944). 
28 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. The Court employs a higher threshold 
requirement for parties to provide a tribunal with Kompetenz-Kompetenz; 
in contrast, the arbitrability of a merits issue is given the presumption of 
assent by the Court when the agreement is silent as to the particular issue, 
but the Court reverses the presumption on the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 
944-45. The Court’s rationale was that it is less likely that a party will 
realize that it is forfeiting its jurisdictional right when it signs an 
arbitration agreement. Id. at 945. 
29 See William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction: Timing and 
Finality in American Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135, 156-57 (2007). 
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“arbitrability”) but (ii) such agreement must be founded on 
clear evidence.”30   
In First Options, an arbitral award had been rendered 
against both an investment company and its owners with 
respect to debts owed to a securities clearing house. The 
owners (the Kaplans) argued that they had never signed the 
arbitration agreement and consequently were not bound by 
the award. The Supreme Court carefully distinguished 
between three questions: (i) did the Kaplans owe money (the 
substantive merits)? (ii) did the Kaplans agree to arbitrate 
(jurisdiction, which the Court called “arbitrability”)? And (iii) 
Who (court or arbitrator) should decide whether the Kaplans 
agreed to arbitrate (which the Court called the “standard of 
review” question)?31 
On the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that 
the Kaplans had not agreed to arbitrate. The Court decided 
this without any judicial deference to the arbitrator’s 
determination.32 Whether the Kaplans were bound to 
arbitrate by virtue of a clause signed by their investment 
                                                 
 
 
30 Id. at 157. 
31 First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. Question (iii) was the main issue in BG 
Group regarding the interpretation of the local litigation requirement of 
the bilateral investment treaty. The Court stated:  
[T]he question before us is who—court or arbitrator—
bears primary responsibility for interpreting and 
applying Article 8’s local court litigation provision. Put in 
terms of standards of judicial review, should a United 
States court review the arbitrators’ interpretation and 
application of the provision de novo, or with the deference 
that courts ordinarily show arbitral decisions on matters 
the parties have committed to arbitration? 
BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014).  
32 First Options, 514 U.S. at 947. 
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company was a question for the courts. It was for a judge, not 
arbitrator, to provide the ultimate determination on whether 
Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan were in fact bound to arbitrate by reason 
of the actions of their investment company, on theories such 
as agency, alter ego, or lifting the corporate veil. The Court 
went further and suggested that “the arbitrability question 
itself” might be submitted to arbitration.33 What then is 
“arbitrability”? 
C. ARBITRABILITY AS A TOOL FOR KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ 
Arbitrability is a term of art. It is fair to state that the 
term “arbitrability” in the U.S. has a broader meaning than 
the traditional meaning accorded this term in other parts of 
the world. The disparity in meaning contributes to the lack of 
clarity in the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the U.S. 
Arbitrability in the U.S. “denote[s] every condition or 
requirement that must be met in order for an arbitration to go 
forward.”34 This version of arbitrability encompasses an array 
of diverse issues.35 This poses the following questions: “Does 
an agreement to arbitrate exist?36 Is that agreement valid and 
enforceable?37 Are both parties signatories to the agreement 
                                                 
 
 
33 Id. at 943. 
34 Bermann, supra note 13, at 10. 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
37 See, e.g., AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 
(1986). 
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or otherwise bound by it?38 Does the agreement cover the 
particular dispute at hand?”39  
Other questions commonly characterized as issues of 
arbitrability include where a party resisting arbitration argues 
that the other party has failed to satisfy a condition precedent 
to arbitration,40 or that some other barrier to arbitration stands 
in arbitration’s way, whether time limits on the underlying 
claim41 or the principle of res judicata.42 Thus, court decisions 
in the US speak of the “arbitrability question” in the same way 
that the rest of the world refers to jurisdictional issue.43 The 
American approach asks not only “who decides what,” but 
also “who decides who decides.”44 
On the other hand, the term may be used in a much 
narrower sense, confined to one specific question: Did the 
legislature, in establishing or recognizing a particular cause of 
                                                 
 
 
38 See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964). 
39 See, e.g., Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 
2008); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532-33 (3d Cir. 
2005); Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004); Cap Gemini 
Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 2003). 
40 See, e.g. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1027-
28 (11th Cir. 1982); Eady v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 
1286 (M.D. Ala. 2003). This was one of the arguments advanced by the 
Republic of Argentina in the BG Group decision. Argentina argued that the 
Article 8 local litigation requirement under the UK-Argentina BIT was a 
condition precedent to arbitration. Consequently, Argentina essentially 
submitted that the issue fell in the realm of arbitrability and therefore 
within the competence of the Court to decide, based on First Options. 
41 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
42 See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of 
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623 (1988). 
43 Park, supra note 29, at 145. 
44 Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
287 (1999).  
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action, authorize its adjudication by an arbitral tribunal, or 
did the legislature reserve its adjudication to courts of law?45 
This is the more widespread understanding of the term in 
other parts of the world. This meaning is evidenced in the 
“non-arbitrability” ground found both in the 1958 New York 
Convention46 and in the UNCITRAL Model Law47. Used in 
this way, arbitrability denotes only one of the many objections 
                                                 
 
 
45 This is notably how the term is most often employed in international 
arbitration. See, e.g. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 122 (student ed. 2009) (“Arbitrability 
…involves determining which types of dispute may be resolved by 
arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain of the courts”); 
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 767 (2009) 
(“[Arbitrability] refers to subjects or disputes which are deemed by a 
particular national law to be incapable of resolution by arbitration, even if 
the parties have otherwise validly agreed to arbitrate such matters. ”); 
Loukas A. Mistelis, Arbitrability – International and Comparative Perspectives: 
Is Arbitrability a National or International Law Issue?, in ARBITRABILITY: 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 3-4, (2009). 
(“Arbitrability …involves the simple question of what types of issues can 
and cannot be submitted to arbitration and whether specific classes of 
disputes are exempt from arbitration proceedings. While party autonomy 
espouses the right of parties to submit any dispute to arbitration, national 
laws often impose restrictions or limitations on what matters can be 
referred to and resolved by arbitration.”). 
46 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, 1958, arts. II(1), V(2)(a). 
These sections are implemented in the United States by 9 U.S.C. §§201-08. 
47 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments as 
adopted in 2006 (Vienna: United Nations, 2008), available at 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_a
rbitration.html. 
422 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
to arbitral jurisdiction, namely that the underlying claim may 
not, as a matter of law, be submitted to arbitration.48  
With respect to the timing of judicial intervention on 
jurisdictional matters, the FAA creates no statutory 
presumption that courts should await the award before 
pronouncing themselves on an arbitrator’s authority to hear a 
dispute.49 At any stage in the arbitral process, courts can 
decide whether a particular matter has been (or can be) 
submitted to arbitration, usually in the context of a motion to 
compel arbitration or to stay litigation.50 As fully developed 
below, the UNCITRAL Model Law has an additional 
approach to these threshold issues.51 
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide 
practical instances on the methodology of determining these 
jurisdictional questions by American courts. Usually, to 
allocate the jurisdictional authority between courts and 
arbitrators, the court looks at the kind of jurisdictional issue 
involved in the case. Thus, the threshold issues are usually 




                                                 
 
 
48 Bermann, supra note 13, at 12. 
49 Park, supra note 29, at 156. 
50 See United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, supra note 4. 
51 Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for courts 
determination of these issues at the preliminary stage of the proceedings 
or after an award has been rendered. The important distinction, which is 
the main purport of this paper, is to understand the consequences of the 
court’s determination of these threshold issues as a preliminary matter. In 
that case, particular restrictions come into play with respect to timing and 
appeals of the court’s review of arbitrator’s determinations. 
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1. PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY 
 
Time limits is an issue that the court has characterized 
as “procedural”. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,52 a 
majority of the Supreme Court held that arbitrators should be 
allowed to decide this timing issue in the first instance, since 
it represents a matter that “parties would likely expect that an 
arbitrator would decide.”53 According to the Court, 
“‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and 
bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the 
judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.”54 Therefore, The Court 
in Howsam concluded that a question on time limits for 
arbitration is one that, had they thought about the matter, the 
parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause would 
most likely have expected an arbitral tribunal to decide.55 
The Supreme Court in Howsam did not catalogue “[the] 
‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and 
bear on its final disposition,”56 but lower courts have 
identified other examples and handled them accordingly. For 
instance, a party resisting arbitration may argue that its 
opponent, whether by words or conduct, waived its right to 
invoke an agreement to arbitrate. Like time limits on 
arbitration, waiver of this sort targets the obligation to 
arbitrate rather than the contract’s substantive obligations 
                                                 
 
 
52 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra note 41, at 79. 
53 Id. at 84. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 85; see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 
U.S. 487, 491 (1972) (holding that a defense of laches must be decided by 
the arbitral tribunal). 
56 Id. at 79 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 
(1964)). 
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and should be treated as issues meant for the court rather than 
arbitrators. However, current case law tells a different story. 
In fact, courts commonly leave the question of waiver of the 
right to arbitrate for the arbitrators to decide, even if raised at 
the outset, often citing Howsam.57 Even so, the decisions are 
not uniform in that regard. A good number of courts have 
drawn a distinction between contract-based waiver and 
conduct-based waiver, holding that the former is for the 
arbitral tribunal to decide, while the latter may be determined 
at the threshold by a court.58 This provides one instance of 
                                                 
 
 
57 See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384-94 (2d Cir. 
2011); Pro Tech Indus., Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 2004); Banc 
One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2004); Feldman v. 
Empire Today, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44574, at *4-6 (N.D. III. Apr. 26, 
2011); Josko v. New World Sys. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64681, at *25-28 
(D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2006); cf. Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l 
Ass’n, Local 38, 351 F.3d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the question 
of whether conduct constituted contract termination was an issue for the 
district court, and not an arbitration panel). 
58 See JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393-94 (6th Cir. 
2008) (holding that a party’s deliberate effort to derail arbitration sought 
by its opponent would constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, though 
a deliberate effort was not established in this case). The court observed 
that, most often, conduct-based waiver is established by a party’s failure 
to invoke arbitration in a timely fashion after being sued or its interference 
with a plaintiff’s pre-litigation efforts to arbitrate. Id. at 394; see also 
Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (finding that a party’s litigation activity was not so extensive and 
the burden caused to the other party was not so great as to warrant a 
finding of waiver), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011), cert. dismissed, 131 
S. Ct. 2955 (2011); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 
2008) (finding that an employer statement that an employee’s claim is not 
ripe for arbitration does not amount to a waiver); Khan v. Parsons Global 
Servs. Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that filing a motion 
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confusion and lack of clarity in the US with respect to 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This lack of clarity is based on the fact 
that Kompetenz-Kompetenz is, to a large extent, hinged on the 
US understanding of arbitrability.  
Further, there may be certain requirements the parties 
must comply with before they initiate arbitration. Whether a 
party complies with these preconditions59 is undoubtedly a 
threshold issue, and arbitration-clause-specific. Thus, by 
authority of First Options, should be left for the court to 
determine. While judicial practice is mixed, courts often 
characterize such matters as “procedural” and refer them for 
decision by arbitrators in the first instance.60 Again, this 
                                                 
 
 
for summary judgment waives the right to invoke arbitration); Ehleiter v. 
Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
party seeking arbitration waived that right by actively litigating its 
opponent’s claims); Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 3, 12-13 
(1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that the failure to invoke arbitration 
during the pendency of administrative proceedings before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission constituted waiver); Windward 
Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co., 123 F. App’x 481, 484 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding that appellant’s failure to comply with the district court’s order 
to initiate arbitration proceedings for many years constituted a timeliness 
issue for the district court to decide); Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 
Equicredit Corp. of Am., 97 F. App’x 462, 464 (5 th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(holding that delaying the motion to compel does not amount to waiver); 
Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 
F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that declining arbitration by letter 
constitutes waiver). 
59 These preconditions may include submitting the dispute first to 
mediation or conciliation, or exhaust other remedies before initiating 
arbitration.  
60 See, e.g. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1964). 
See also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Broadspire Mgmt. Servs., 623 F.3d 476, 
477 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that whether necessary preconditions to 
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mixed judicial attitude is a consequence of the lack of clear 
textual basis under the FAA for Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
Notably, the “local litigation” requirement in BG Group was 
characterized as a procedural precondition. Thus, in resolving 
the dispositive issue as to “who-court or arbitrator-bears 
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local 
litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?,” the 
Court held that the matter is for the arbitrators.61  
Sometimes, a party resisting arbitration maintains that 
the dispute sought to be arbitrated has already been 
adjudicated, resulting in a judgment or award entitled to 
claim-preclusive effect, so that the case should not be heard 
again, either in arbitration or litigation. This is the issue of res 
judicata. This objection, too, is arbitration-specific, and should 
be for the courts to determine. Moreover, it makes little sense 
to enforce an agreement to arbitrate if the outcome of the 
dispute has already been determined as a matter of law. 
                                                 
 
 
arbitration have been satisfied is a question for the arbitrator); 3M Co. v. 
Amex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that condition 
precedent is a matter of procedural arbitrability, which is decided by the 
arbitrator); JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 
2008); Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Ironworkers, Shopman’s Local 493 v. EFCO Corp., 
359 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the timeliness of procedural 
steps as a precondition to arbitration is an issue for the arbitrator); Stroh 
Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that failure to comply with pre-arbitration steps in a grievance procedure 
is an issue of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator). But see, Welborn 
Clinic v. Medquist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2002) (compelling 
arbitration since, under Indiana law, time limits and other requirements 
are not conditions precedent). 
61 BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198, 1206. (2014). 
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However, in practice, courts almost invariably reserve the 
claim preclusion question for the arbitrators.62  
The availability of class arbitration is another threshold 
issue of the procedural category. The question of whether a 
dispute is susceptible of class arbitration goes primarily to the 
arbitration clause rather than the main contract, and so is yet 
another matter that would ordinarily be appropriate for the 
court to determine. However, available cases do not reflect 
that. Thus, in Green Tree v. Bazzle, the Supreme Court 
characterized the question, whether the parties contemplated 
class arbitration of their dispute, as one that the parties would 
have expected the arbitral tribunal to decide.63 Although the 
Court’s later decision in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds 
International Corp.64 laid down a standard that makes it 
decidedly more difficult for arbitrators to conclude that the 
parties contemplated class arbitration,65 that determination 
                                                 
 
 
62 See, e.g. Shell Oil Co. v. CO2 Comm., Inc.,589 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 
2009); Triangle Constr. & Maint. Corp. v. Our V.I. Labor Union, 425 F.3d 938, 
947 (11th Cir. 2005); Klay v. United Healthgroup, 376 F.3d 1092, 1109-10 (11th 
Cir. 2004); Shanks v. Swift Transp. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55063 (S.D. 
Tex. June 19, 2008); Enter. Assoc. Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638 v. 
Empire Mech., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4749 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1992). But 
see FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Alt, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5853 (1st Cir. Mar. 
23, 2011). 
63 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003). 
64 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et. al., v. Animalfeeds Int’l. Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 
(2010). 
65 Id. at 1775 (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit 
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that 
the party agreed to do so.”); See also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (2011) (barring California from treating class arbitration waivers 
as unenforceable, essentially finding such a prohibition to be inconsistent 
with the FAA). 
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nevertheless remains one for the arbitral tribunal to make in 
the first instance.66 
Courts will refer issues of this “procedural” sort to the 
arbitrators. Although the strength of the argument in favor of 
referring these questions to an arbitral tribunal may vary from 
issue to issue and from case to case it will be more useful to 
treat these entire series of objections to arbitration in a 
consistent and predictable manner. This is particularly 
necessary under the FAA because of the absence of defined 
authority for arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction. 
This situation is comparable to the clear position under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.67  
The foregoing depicts the uncertainty in classifying 
issues of arbitrability in US courts. From a logical standpoint, 
most of these issues relate to arbitration-specific questions. 
Thus, based on First Options, they should not be treated as 
mere procedural issues but questions that go to the very heart 
of the arbitration. 
Instances have come up more recently as to how 
Howsam’s framework has proven difficult to apply in practice. 
In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, for example, the plaintiff 
sued his former employer for employment discrimination, 
and the defendant responded by seeking to compel 
arbitration pursuant to a written arbitration agreement that 
expressly delegated to the arbitrator the “exclusive authority 
to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 
applicability, enforceability or formation of” the arbitration 
                                                 
 
 
66 See, e.g., Guida v. Home Savings of Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69159, 
at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011). 
67 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, Art. 16(1), at 8, (2006). 
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agreement itself.68 The plaintiff opposed arbitration on the 
ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable 
under controlling state law.69 A split court ruled that the 
plaintiff’s unconscionability argument was for the arbitrator, 
not the court. The reasoning was that this argument was 
directed at the arbitration agreement as a whole and not at the 
specific provision. The court characterized the agreement as 
antecedent, severable agreement, thereby vesting the 
arbitrator with authority to adjudicate challenges to 
enforceability of the agreement as a whole.70 Characterizing 
the entire arbitration agreement as a single facet of a broader 
employment agreement, the dissent argued that under First 
Options the plaintiff’s unconscionability argument was a 
question of arbitrability requiring judicial resolution.71 
Rent-A-Center shows continued uncertainty regarding 
how courts identify questions of arbitrability. The same 
uncertainty was raised in the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision 
in NASDAQ Group, Inc. v. UBS Securities, LLC.72 There, a 
broker-dealer sought to arbitrate claims against the NASDAQ 
exchange related to the exchange’s alleged mishandling of the 
Facebook IPO.73 Although the parties had an agreement 
containing a broad arbitration clause that would otherwise 
have constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an 
intent to vest the arbitration panel with authority to 
determine arbitrability, the clause was expressly drafted 
subject to a set of NASDAQ rules that arguably immunized 
                                                 
 
 
68 Rent-A- Center, West, Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 65-66 (2010). 
69 Id. at 66. 
70 Id. at 70-73. 
71 Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72 NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC., 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014). 
73 Id. at 1016-17. 
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the exchange from liability for the sorts of claims asserted by 
the broker-dealer.74 Rather than construing the NASDAQ 
rules as raising the sort of defense to liability that Howsam 
suggested would be subject to resolution by the arbitrator, the 
Second Circuit ruled that reference to the rules in the 
arbitration clause itself raised an ambiguity regarding 
whether the parties had in fact intended to vest the arbitrator 
with authority to determine the arbitrability of the specific 
claims asserted.75 
In short, while First Options purported to answer the 
question of who decides arbitrability, it appears that the focus 
shifted from the question “who decides” to the question 
“what is being decided.” Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts 
to resolve that issue in Howsam, it is clear that confusion and 
uncertainty remains. 
2. SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRABILITY 
Every other threshold issue not characterized as 
“procedural”, is, at least a priori, substantive and are to be 
decided by the court. Generally, issues such as “[w]hether the 
parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a 
concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type 
of controversy”76 are characterized as substantive 
arbitrability issues. This is however not always clear. For 
instance, threshold disputes over the applicability of an 
arbitration agreement present courts with a dilemma. This is 
the elusive “scope” of arbitration question. From a 
                                                 
 
 
74 Id. at 1031-32. 
75 Id. 
76 Green Tree Fin. Corp, supra note 63, at 452. 
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separability viewpoint, such matters are substantive 
arbitrability matters, because they relate specifically and 
uniquely to the arbitration clause rather than to the contract 
as a whole. Moreover, they significantly implicate party 
consent. In that connection, the legitimacy of the proceedings 
and the eventual award. Parties do not agree to arbitrate 
every imaginable dispute that may arise between them. They 
agree to arbitrate only a certain universe of claims that they 
themselves have defined. 
Questions concerning the scope of an agreement to 
arbitrate are accordingly often ranged alongside the question 
of whether an arbitration agreement was formed, whether it 
is valid and enforceable, and whether a given person is or 
may be deemed a party to it.77 They are therefore substantive 
arbitrability issues left for courts to determine. There are 
several arguments as to where the question of scope properly 
belongs. However, that is slightly beyond the scope of this 
paper.78 
III. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ UNDER THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW 
The situation with regard to the process of determining 
arbitral jurisdiction is different under the Model law. It is 
different in two main respects, namely (1) under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, there is a clear textual basis for 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, and (2) under the UNCITRAL Model 
                                                 
 
 
77 Bermann, supra note 13, at 37. 
78 See generally, Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an 
Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753 (2004). 
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Law, there is stipulation of a time limit for challenge of 
arbitral determination on their own jurisdiction. 
A. TEXTUAL FOUNDATION FOR KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ 
 
Unlike the FAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly 
provides for the authority of arbitral tribunals to decide on 
their jurisdiction, if challenged.79 In this regard, article 16 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides as follows: 
 
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the 
arbitration agreement.80 
 
In addition, article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model law provides 
that: 
 
A court before which an action is brought in a 
matter which is the subject of an arbitration 
agreement shall, if a party so requests not later 
than when submitting his first statement on the 
substance of the dispute, refer the parties to 
arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.81 
 
                                                 
 
 
79 See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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 Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is quite similar 
in effect to sections 3 and 4 of the FAA which authorizes the 
relevant US district court to stay judicial proceedings and 
compel arbitration in proceedings referable to arbitration. 
German law, which is fashioned towards the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, is also similar in this respect. It allows for broad 
judicial intervention on certain issues at the threshold of 
arbitration. Section 1032(1) of the German Civil Procedure 
Code (“ZPO”) entitles the defendant in a court action on a 
claim that it contends is subject exclusively to arbitration to 
seek a ruling that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the 
matter on the merits. To prevail on the jurisdictional issue, 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is 
“null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”82 
 However, the difference is American courts may 
entertain applications for jurisdictional declarations at any 
time.83 They may order a full examination of the validity of an 
                                                 
 
 
82 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 30, 
1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1032, ¶ 1, translated 
in Peter Hubert, § 1032 – Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim 
Before Court, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 
139 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegal, Stefan Michael Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento 
eds., 2007) (“A court before which an action is brought in a matter which 
is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if the respondent raises an 
objection prior to the beginning of the oral hearing on the substance of the 
dispute, reject the action as inadmissible unless the court finds that the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed”). The language of section 1032(1) tracks Article 8(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, whose language “null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed” derives from Article II (3) of the New York 
Convention.  
83 See Park, supra note 29, at 139. 
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arbitration clause at any stage of the arbitral process to 
determine whether , as a matter of fact and law, the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate.84 Under the Model law, such delay 
may be a waiver.85 In this regard, article 16(2) provides that:  
 
A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the 
submission of the statement of defense. A party is 
not precluded from raising such a plea by the 
fact that he has appointed, or participated in the 
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the 
arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its 
authority shall be raised as soon as the matter 
alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is 
raised during the arbitral proceedings. The 
arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a 
later plea if it considers the delay justified.  
 
Certainly, an argument can be made that based on the 
last sentence of this provision, the tribunal has discretion to 
entertain an objection regarding its own jurisdiction. 
However, it is important to notice that the requirement 
objecting before the submission of the statement of defense is 
couched in mandatory terms by the use of the word “shall.” 
The tribunal may only admit a subsequent plea in rare 
                                                 
 
 
84 See, e.g. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
85 See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67. In this respect, Art. 16(2) of 
the UNICTRAL Model Law provides that (“A plea that the arbitral 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the 
submission of the statement of defence”); Similarly, Art. 4 of the 
UNICTRAL Model Law provides for (“Waiver of right to object”). 
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circumstances because of the wording of the provision. This 
is an important issue to also consider in terms of the efficiency 
of arbitration under the UNCITRAL Model Law regime, as 
opposed to the United States system under the FAA. The 
American position is different from several other 
jurisdictions. For instance, if German courts are asked to hear 
a matter which one side asserts is subject to arbitration, they 
decide immediately on the validity and scope of the 
arbitration agreement.86 In France, such challenges normally 
wait until an award has been made.87 In England, litigants 
have a right to declaratory decisions on arbitral authority, but 
only if they take no part in the arbitration.88  
In addition, the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly 
prevents unnecessary intervention by the courts. The Model 
law provides that “[i]n matters governed by this law, no court 
shall intervene except where so provided in this Law.”89 The 
FAA does not have a similar provision, making arbitration 
under the FAA less efficient compared to proceedings under 
the UNCITRAL Model Law. A follow up question would be 
whether the US is as pro-arbitration as it is said to be? It is 
difficult to say that this pro-arbitration perception is accurate 
in light of the possible ways in which the FAA needs to be 
improved. 
                                                 
 
 
86 ZPO, supra note 82, at § 1032(1). 
87 Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile [N.C.P.C.], art. 1458. This permits 
pre-arbitration review only to determine if the arbitration clause is 
“clearly void” (manifestement nulle).  
88 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 27 (Eng.) § 72 (1996). In a sense, this is 
similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law which limits the right to object to 
situations where the objecting party has not waived the right based on the 
grounds provided under the Model Law. 
89 See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67, at art. 5. 
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B. LIMITS ON REVIEW OF ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION 
 
Not only does the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly 
stipulate that an arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule 
on its own jurisdiction,90 it also authorizes the tribunal to rule 
on the jurisdictional challenge as a preliminary question.91 In 
that regard, the Model Law provides that: 
 
If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary 
question that it has jurisdiction, any party may 
request, within thirty days after having received 
notice of that ruling, the court … to decide the 
matter, which decision shall be subject to no 
appeal…”92 
 
Two important features are available under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law regime, which do not exist under the 
FAA. These are critical features which are likely to impact the 
time spent in resolving a dispute, depending on which law 
applies as the lex arbitri. These features include: (1) the thirty-
day time limit within which a party may seek a review of 
arbitral determination on jurisdiction, and (2) the fact that a 
finding from a court on the said arbitral determination on 
jurisdiction is “subject to no appeal.” These differences 
between the FAA and the UNCITRAL Model Law are 
significant. They play out when one side to the dispute 
applies to a court with supervisory (curial) competence over 
the arbitration, asking that the proceedings be stopped or that 
                                                 
 
 
90 Id. at Art. 16. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
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a case be heard notwithstanding an alleged arbitration 
agreement. This happens a majority of the time in arbitral 
proceedings and as such, the importance of these provisions 
cannot be overemphasized. 
In BG Group, Argentina claimed that the tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because (1) BG Group 
was not a Treaty-protected investor; (2) BG Group’s interest 
in MetroGAS was not a Treaty-protected investment; and (3) 
BG Group initiated arbitration without litigating its claims in 
Argentina’s courts, despite Article 8’s local litigation 
requirement.93 In late December 2007, the arbitration panel in 
BG Group determined it had jurisdiction to consider the merits 
of the dispute. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, as soon as 
that decision on jurisdiction was rendered, parties would 
have an automatic right to seek a review by the relevant court 
of the seat. Further, a decision of such a court would be open 
to review for thirty days after which a party loses the right to 
seek further review of that decision. What is more, such a 
decision is not subject to appeal. 
Contrasting this UNCITRAL Model Law position with 
what happened in BG Group, we find that Argentina first 
applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking to vacate the award in part on the ground that the 
arbitrators lacked jurisdiction.94 The District Court denied 
Argentina’s claims. Under the Model Law, appeals would 
have ended and the decision of the arbitrators would have 
prevailed. However, since the dispute was decided under the 
FAA, Argentina had the right to further appeal, and it did so. 
Argentina appealed the District Court’s decision to the Court 
                                                 
 
 
93 BG Group, PLC, v. Rep. 134 U.S. 1198, 1204 (2014). 
94 Id. at 1205.  
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of Appeals for the district of Columbia Circuit. The DC Circuit 
reversed the arbitral determination on jurisdiction. In the 
Court of Appeal’s view, the interpretation and application of 
Article 8’s local litigation requirement was a matter for courts 
to decide de novo, i.e. without deference to the views of the 
arbitrators.95 Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the 
circumstances did not excuse BG Group’s failure to comply 
with the requirement. Rather, BG Group must “commence a 
lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait eighteen months 
before filing for arbitration.”96 Because BG Group had not 
done so, the arbitrators lacked authority to decide the dispute. 
The Court of Appeals ordered the award vacated. 
The judicial challenge did not end there. BG Group 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Appealing arbitral 
determination on jurisdiction without restriction defeats the 
purpose of international arbitration. It is essentially bringing 
a dispute under the domestic court system of the seat of 
arbitration. This could lead to the so-called “Russian Doll” 
effect, where arbitral decisions are appealed all the way to the 
highest court.97 The point here is that from 2007 when the 
jurisdictional issue was determined by the tribunal, parties 
took turns in appealing that decision to the highest court in 
the United States. The final decision was issued in 2014. Thus, 
for about seven years, parties fought over whether the 





97 Marike R. P. Paulsson, Comissa v. PEMEX Thethe Sequel: Are the Floodgates 
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tribunal had jurisdiction (although the merits formed part of 
the appeal).  
Judges in the United States, particularly in locations such as 
Washington, D.C., New York, California, etc. are quite 
familiar with arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
Even so, the BG Group case took seven years from the 
tribunal’s decision to finally lay the issue of arbitral 
jurisdiction to rest at the US Supreme Court. One wonders 
how this would play out in other less arbitration-friendly 
jurisdictions, especially ones that have not adopted 
progressive laws such as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It 
would take much longer–the more reason jurisdictions need 
to adopt arbitration laws with efficient regulation of the 
proceedings. 
 
C. STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF ARBITRAL DETERMINATION 
 
In addition to adopting a unique form of “arbitrability” 
as a tool in determining competency to decide jurisdictional 
issues lies, U.S. Courts have also adopted certain standards of 
review in the allocation of said competence. The most 
significant dividing line relates to whether the judge will 
make a full inquiry into the parties’ intent, or simply a 
summary examination, applying what is sometimes called a 
prima facie or deferential standard. To a large extent, the 
jurisprudence regarding the standards of review mirrors the 
analysis under procedural and substantive arbitrability.98 
Thus, issues characterized as those of procedural arbitrability 
are generally for the arbitrator to determine. Courts generally 
                                                 
 
 
98 See subheading III(C)(1) & (2) above, on procedural and substantive 
arbitrability. 
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engage in deferential or prima facie review with regard to 
those issues. On the other hand, issues of substantive 
arbitrability are for the courts to review de novo, without any 
deference to the arbitrator’s determination.  
For example, a seller might bring a judicial action to 
collect the price of an engine. In response, the buyer (who 
alleges the engine was defective) might move to stay 
litigation, asserting that the parties had agreed to arbitrate 
their dispute. The seller might reply with allegations that the 
arbitration clause was void. 
In the alternative, the buyer might file an arbitration 
for product malfunction, alleging an engine explosion that 
caused personal injury and loss of profits. Here, it would be 
the seller (preferring to be in court) who asks a judge to 
address the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, 
perhaps arguing that the person who signed the clause lacked 
authority or that the clause was not broad enough to cover the 
tort action for personal injury or the financial claim for lost 
profits. 
In either instance, judges will need to decide whether 
to examine arbitral jurisdiction in depth or to do so 
deferentially or under summary (prima facie) standard. In the 
latter event, they may leave fuller review to the time after an 
award has been rendered. 
In France, until an award is rendered, judges address 
the validity and scope of an arbitration clause only in the most 
superficial manner and only in the event no arbitral tribunal 
has been constituted.99 The court can ask whether the clause 
was clearly void (for example, whether the arbitration clause 
exists at all) but may not address more complex questions, 
                                                 
 
 
99 N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at art. 1458. 
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such as whether the corporate officer signing the arbitration 
agreement had authority to do so. Once arbitration has started 
however, judges sit on their hands until the award is made.100 
By contrast, U.S. courts may engage in full examination 
of arbitral power regardless of whether the arbitration has 
begun, and irrespective of whether they are being asked to 
hear the merits of the claims. The court might decide that the 
lawsuit should stop and the arbitration should proceed. Or 
vice versa. The court might also pass this jurisdictional 
question back to the arbitrators themselves for their 
determination.101 
As a general matter, a prima facie standard would be 
relevant only with respect to pre-award requests for 
declarations and injunctions, which implicate a prophylactic 
role for courts in the sense of preventing an arbitrator from 
                                                 
 
 
100 Compare the Canadian case of Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des 
consommateurs [2007] S.C.R. 34 (Can.) (where The Canadian Supreme 
Court opted for the minimum standard of review at the time an arbitration 
begins. The Canadian decision interpreted the jurisdictional provisions of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law as enacted in Québec. Unlike the French 
statute, however, the Model Law permits judicial intervention even after 
arbitration has commenced); See generally Frédéric Bachand, Does Article 8 
of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
Jurisdiction? 22 ARB. INT’L 463 (2006). 
101 In some countries, courts distinguish between arbitration held at home 
or abroad. Swiss courts, for example, make a comprehensive review of the 
validity of the arbitration clause when the arbitration has its seat abroad. 
By contrast, when the arbitration is held in Switzerland, judges engage 
only in a summary examination of arbitral jurisdiction (examen sommaire) 
delaying fuller review until the award stage. Compare Swiss Tribunal 
federal decisions in Fondation M. Banque X, ATF 122 III 139 (Apr. 29, 1996) 
(arbitration in Switzerland), with Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA 
v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA. ATF 121 III 38 (Jan. 16, 1995) 
(arbitration abroad). 
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making an unauthorized decision. The jurisdictional 
foundation of an arbitral proceeding must be monitored 
before anyone knows what the arbitrator will decide. The 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction becomes an issue because judges are 
asked to make a respondent participate, or tell a claimant that 
the arbitration lacks jurisdictional foundation.102 
By contrast, when arbitral jurisdiction becomes an 
issue in the endgame, after an award is rendered, judges 
exercise a remedial function, correcting mistakes that allegedly 
occurred earlier in the arbitral process. The validity of an 
award might be subject to judicial scrutiny at the arbitral seat, 
through motions to vacate or to confirm under local law,103 or 
to recognize an award rendered abroad under the New York 
Convention. At this point, a different set of concerns present 
themselves, calling for a deeper judicial scrutiny of both the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the relevant public policy 
implications of the award. 
 
IV. BRIEF COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
As mentioned earlier, the struggle to determine who 
decides questions of arbitrability is largely an American 
phenomenon, the result of the FAA’s silence on the issue and 
the American court’s subsequent need to develop rules of 
decision in light of perceived Congressional intent and 
fundamental principles of contract law. Other jurisdictions 
have managed to avoid the lasting uncertainty catalogued 
above by codifying the rules of decision. 
                                                 
 
 
102 See United States (Federal) Arbitration Act supra note 4. 
103 Id. (See for instance, 9 U.S.C.§ 10 which provides for vacatur of an 
award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”). 
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In France, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly vests 
arbitration tribunals with “exclusive jurisdiction” to 
determine their jurisdiction.104 The Code also provides that 
the existence of an arbitration agreement divests the courts of 
jurisdiction entirely, except where the arbitration panel “has 
not yet been seized of the dispute” and the arbitration 
agreement is “manifestly void or manifestly not applicable” – 
an exception that is strictly interpreted.105 Application of this 
principle, “compétence-compétence,” means that even where 
the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction is in question, the 
arbitration tribunal itself enjoys “chronological priority” to 
decide the issue and the courts remain divested of jurisdiction 
unless the parties mutually consent to judicial intervention.106 
This is commonly referred to as negative Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.107  
Whereas the American approach to the question of 
who determines arbitrability is directed primarily at 
vindicating the parties’ contract, the French approach places 
a greater premium on preventing dilatory tactics and 
encouraging the centralized and efficient resolution of all 
disputes surrounding the subject of the arbitration. This does 
not mean, however, that the courts have no role. It simply 
means that whereas American courts exercise chronological 
                                                 
 
 
104 N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at Art. 1465. 
105 Id. at Art. 1448 para. 1 
106 Id. at Art. 1448 para. 2. (stating court “may not decline jurisdiction on 
its own motion,” giving parties the ability to jointly consent to judicial 
intervention). 
107 See Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of Competence-
Competence; The Role of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT 
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: 
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, 260.   
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precedence, acting as a gate-keeper to arbitration, the French 
courts act as a back-stop. In that sense, the French courts 
exercise a limited review of the arbitration panel’s decision – 
including its decision regarding arbitrability – once that 
decision had been delivered.108 
English law strikes something of a balance between the 
American and French approaches. Like the French Code, the 
English Arbitration Act expressly empowers an arbitration 
panel to “rule on its own substantive jurisdiction,” including 
“what matters have been submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with the arbitration agreement.”109 Unlike the 
French approach, however, the English courts are not 
divested of jurisdiction,110 and may be called on to make a 
determination as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
(and hence the arbitrability of the parties’ dispute) – but only 
when all parties agree to seek such ruling, or when the 
tribunal itself allows a party to do so.111 Otherwise, a party 
must await issuance of an award before challenging the 






                                                 
 
 
108 See N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at Art. 1492, para. 1 (allowing a court to “set 
aside” domestic award where the “arbitral tribunal wrongly upheld or 
declined jurisdiction”); See also Id. at Art. 1520, para. 1 (which holds the 
same with respect to international awards).  
109 See English Arbitration Act (1996), supra note 88. 
110 Id. at § 9. 
111 Id. at § 32. 
112 Id. at § 67(1). 
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V. BG GROUP MAJORITY OPINION 
A. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND DECISION 
Article 8 of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Argentina contained 
a requirement which authorized a party to submit a dispute 
“to the decision of the competent tribunal of the Contracting 
Party in whose territory the investment was made,”113 such as 
a local court, and allowed arbitration, “where, after a period 
of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the 
dispute was submitted to [that] tribunal…, the said tribunal 
has not given its final decision.” (the local litigation 
requirement).114 BG Group PLC, a British firm, belonged to a 
consortium with a majority interest in MetroGAS, an 
Argentine entity awarded an exclusive license to distribute 
natural gas in Buenos Aires.  
At about the same period when BG Group’s 
consortium acquired the interest in MetroGAS, Argentina 
enacted statutes providing that regulators would calculate 
gas “tariffs” in US dollars, and that those tariffs would be set 
at levels sufficient to assure gas distribution firms, such as 
MetroGAS, a reasonable return on their investment in the 
country.115   
In 2001 and 2002, Argentina, faced with economic 
crisis, enacted new laws which changed the calculation of gas 
tariffs from Dollars to Pesos. The effect was that MetroGAS 
                                                 
 
 
113 BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198, 1201 (2014).  
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 1204 
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started losing money. BG Group believed that the changes, 
among others, violated the Treaty. A dispute arose.116 
In 2003, BG Group submitted the dispute to arbitration. 
Parties agreed that the seat of arbitration would be 
Washington, DC. BG Group essentially claimed that 
Argentina’s new laws and regulatory practices violated 
provisions in the BIT forbidding the “expropriation” of 
investments and requiring that each nation give “fair and 
equitable treatment” to investors from the other.117 Argentina 
denied these claims, while also arguing that the arbitration 
tribunal lacked “jurisdiction” to hear the dispute. According 
to Argentina, the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction because: (1) 
BG Group was not a Treaty-protected “investor;” (2) BG 
Group’s interest in MetroGAS was not a Treaty-protected 
“investment;” and (3) BG Group initiated arbitration without 
first litigating its claims in Argentina’s courts, despite the 
Article 8 local litigation requirement. Argentina’s argument 
on the jurisdictional issue was that, failure by BG Group to 
bring its grievance to Argentine courts for 18 months 
rendered its claims in the arbitration inadmissible.118 
In December 2007, the tribunal determined that it had 
jurisdiction. The tribunal concluded that BG Group was an 
investor, that its interest in MetroGAS amounted to a Treaty-
protected investment, and that Argentina’s conduct waived, 
or excused, BG Group’s failure to comply with Article 8’s 
local litigation requirement. These conducts include, among 
others, the fact that the President of Argentina issued a decree 
staying the execution of its courts’ final judgment for 180 days 




117 Id.  
118 Id. 
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in suits claiming harm as a result of the new economic 
measures. In addition, Argentina established a renegotiation 
process for public service contracts such as its contract with 
MetroGAS, to alleviate the negative impact of the new 
economic measures. However, Argentina simultaneously 
barred from participation in that process firms that were 
litigating against Argentina in court or arbitration. Thus, 
requiring a private party in such circumstances to seek relief 
in Argentina’s courts for 18 months, the tribunal concluded, 
would lead to absurd and unreasonable results. Therefore, on 
the merits, the tribunal agreed with Argentina that it had not 
“expropriated” BG Group’s investment, but also found that 
Argentina had denied BG Group “fair and equitable 
treatment.” The tribunal awarded BG Group $185 Million in 
damages.119 
In March 2008, both parties filed petitions for review in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia—BG Group to 
confirm the award under the New York Convention and the 
FAA, and Argentina to vacate the award, in part, because the 
tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The District Court denied 
Argentina’s claims and confirmed the award.120 The Court of 
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, reversed. In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the 
interpretation and application of Article 8’s local litigation 
requirement was a matter for courts to decide de novo, without 
deference to the views of the arbitrators. The court held that 
the circumstances in Argentina did not excuse BG Group’s 
failure to comply with the requirement. Rather, BG Group 
must “commence[d] a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait 
eighteen months before filing for arbitration.” Because BG 
                                                 
 
 
119 Id. at 1204–1206. 
120 Id. at 1206. 
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Group had not done so, the arbitrators lacked authority to 
decide the dispute. The D.C. Circuit ordered the award 
vacated.121 
BG Group appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. The issue there was: who, court or arbitrator, bears 
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local 
litigation provision of the BIT? In other words, should a US 
court review the arbitrators’ interpretation and application of 
the provision de novo, or with the deference that courts 
ordinarily show arbitral decisions on matters the parties have 
committed to arbitration? The Court held that the matter was 
for the arbitrators, and courts must review the arbitrators’ 
determinations with deference.122 
B. APPLICATION OF ARBITRABILITY AND KOMPETENZ-
KOMPETENZ IN BG GROUP 
In dealing with the issue at hand, the Supreme Court 
started out by treating the treaty in question as an ordinary 
contract between private parties. The Court restated the 
general position that where ordinary contracts are in issue, it 
is up to the parties to determine whether a particular matter 
is primarily for arbitrators or for courts to decide.123 The Court 
went ahead to state that “[I]f the contract is silent on the 
matter of who primarily is to decide ‘threshold’ questions 
                                                 
 
 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1207; See also, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to 
so submit”). 
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about arbitration, courts determine the parties’ intent with the 
help of presumptions.”124  
As mentioned earlier, on one hand, US courts generally 
presume that parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide 
“disputes about arbitrability.”125 On the other hand, when the 
arbitrability question has to do with the meaning and 
application of particular procedural preconditions for the use 
of arbitration, courts presume that the parties intend 
arbitrators, not courts, to decide such disputes.126 Thus, the 
Supreme Court decided that the local litigation requirement 
of the BIT was of the procedural variety because the text and 
structure of the provision clearly makes it operate as a 
procedural condition precedent to arbitration.127 This, the 
court reasoned, was based on the fact that the local litigation 
requirement “determines when the contractual duty to 
arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to 
arbitrate at all.”128 This was hinged on a couple of the Court’s 
previous decisions. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, the 
Court held that whether a party filed notice of arbitration 
within the time limit provided by the rules of the chosen 
arbitral forum “is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, 
not for the judge.”129 Similarly, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston, the Court held that a mandatory pre-arbitration 
grievance procedure that involved holding two conferences 




125 First Options, supra note 21, at 941, 943-947. 
126 Howsam, supra note 41, at 79-84. (“courts assume parties ‘normally 
expect a forum-based decision-maker to decide forum-specific procedural 
gateway matters’”) 
127 BG Group, supra note 61, at 1207. 
128 Id.  
129 Howsam, supra note 41, at 85. 
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was presumptively for the judge to decide.130 Further, since 
the BIT itself did not provide for anything contradicting this 
presumption, the Court therefore concluded that the 
arbitrators had the primary authority to interpret and apply 
the local litigation provision.131 
As a general matter, this is the default process 
undertaken by American courts faced with questions of 
arbitrability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz. It is unnecessary to go 
through such a process in determining arbitral competence to 
determine their own jurisdiction. It amounts to a waste of 
judicial resources. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 
process is perfunctory. Article 16 provides that the arbitrator 
has the authority to decide on their competence. It does not 
require a court to delve into unnecessarily intricate analysis 
of what is procedural or substantive. Under the UNCITRAL 
Regime, as long as the challenge is geared towards the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, such tribunal always has the 
power to determine the issue. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group, 
it is important to take a step back and understand the 
ramifications of the FAA on arbitration conducted in the 
United States. When the FAA applies, much of the issues 
                                                 
 
 
130 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, (1964). See also, Dialysis 
Access Center, LLC v. RMS Liefline, Inc., 638 F. 3d 367, 383 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(the court held the same in respect to a pre-arbitration “good faith 
negotiations” requirement); see also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Broadspire 
Management Servs., Inc., 623 F. 3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding the same, 
in respect to a pre-arbitration filing of a “Disagreement Notice”). 
131 BG Group, supra note 61, at 1208. 
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relating to arbitrability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz are guided 
by the framework which U.S. courts have established over 
time. Parties do not consciously, with knowledge of the 
implications, submit their disputes to this uncertain regime. 
For the most part, parties who choose any state of the US as 
the seat of their dispute do not fully understand the 
consequences of such a choice. Often, hundreds of millions of 
dollars are at stake in these disputes. It does not make sense 
that parties would consciously want to leave such high-stakes 
disputes to the vagaries of the US arbitration regime. 
Particularly when they have the choice of a more stable and 
predictable framework, the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
It took 11 years for this dispute to be resolved. The 
issue of jurisdiction was appealed through the US court 
system all the way to the Supreme Court. Would it have been 
different had the UNCITRAL Model Law applied as the lex 
arbitri? Very likely yes. As already mentioned, first, the Model 
Law expressly provides that arbitrators have the power to 
determine their jurisdiction. With such express declaration, 
there is little need to seek interpretation of the provision from 
courts. Tribunals would simply apply the provision, and 
parties get the outcome. Second, a review of such a decision 
is to be sought within 30 days. Third, there is no appeal on 
that decision under the Model Law. Undoubtedly, this would 
make for a faster resolution of disputes in the US. In BG Group, 
this would have meant that the District Court’s decision 
confirming the award would have been the final recourse for 
the parties. Interestingly, the Supreme Court upheld the 
District Court’s decision years later. Considering the Supreme 
Court’s decision was the same as the district court’s, it is fair 
to say, at least in the BG Group case, that not limiting the 
appeals process was a waste of judicial resources. 
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In addition, this raises a curious question regarding the 
wisdom behind “non-ICSID” investment arbitration cases. By 
“opting out” of the ICSID system, parties subject their dispute 
to so much unpredictability, especially if they do not choose 
a seat that has fully adopted laws similar to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. This is exactly what happened in BG Group. 
ICSID is a closed, self-contained system which provides for 
faster and more efficient dispute resolution. Parties are better 
off using the ICSID system than having their dispute heard 
outside the system. Contracting states should therefore be 
mindful of terms negotiated in the dispute resolution 
provisions of their BITs. 
The United States Congress must seriously consider 
amending the FAA, if only to provide a textual basis for the 
current jurisprudential position regarding Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. This will bring some certainty to the system. In 
addition, there should be a time limit and limitation on the 
appeals process, similar to the relevant provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. This simple addition to the FAA 
could prevent situations like the one in BG Group where the 
issue of jurisdiction was appealed to the Supreme Court. If the 
BG Group situation continues, then the whole essence of 
international arbitration as a fast, efficient and cost-effective 
means of dispute resolution would be defeated. As mention 
earlier, this will encourage the so-called “Russian-Doll” effect, 
which may discourage users of the process. 
Further, there should be conscious effort by states to 
avoid non-ICSID investment arbitration. Had BG Group been 
decided under the ICSID framework, there is little doubt that 
the dispute would have been decided much faster, saving 
time and money. The ICSID system, like the UNCITRAL 
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regime, expressly recognizes Kompetenz-Kompetenz.132 In 
addition, awards from ICSID are not subject to any national 
court review,133 even though they are seen as court judgments 
of member states’ courts.134 
From the foregoing, can one then say that the US is as 
pro-arbitration as it claims to be? Until the FAA regime is 
fixed to provide clear guidance on basic and important 
arbitration issues like Kompetenz-Kompetenz, my position is 
that the US is in fact not as pro-arbitration as it claims to be. 
Certain things remain to be done in order to lift the country 
to a complete pro-arbitration status. I believe that countries 
that adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law are the quintessential 
pro-arbitration systems. Any country that grapples with a 
very basic feature of international arbitration should not be 
seen as pro-arbitration. The rest of the world is settled on the 
issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but as seen in this paper, the 
US is still having an unnecessary “difficult time.” 
                                                 
 
 
132 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 41, Mar. 19, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (“The 
Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence”). 
133 Id. at art. 53(1). (“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not 
be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in 
this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of 
the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed 
pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”). 
134 Id. at art. 54(1). (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award 
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it 
were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a 
federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal 
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were 
a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”).  
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In the meantime, given the continued uncertainty 
regarding how to determine who should decide these 
“gateway” questions of arbitrability in the United States, 
parties wishing to ensure resolution of such questions by a 
specific decision-maker – whether court or the arbitrator—
should spell out their preference as clearly as possible. 
Conversely, parties seeking to challenge a decision-maker’s 
authority to decide arbitrability should be attentive to 
circumstances that might implicate unresolved aspect of this 
vexing issue. Parties who seek to avoid litigation over this 
threshold question – and who are comfortable with having an 
arbitration panel determine its own jurisdiction in the first 
instance – may wish to consider contracting for arbitration in 
France or the United Kingdom, where judicial involvement is 
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